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"ПОЗИТИВНАЯ" ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ ИЛИ ТЕНДЕНЦИЯ НЕОПРЕДЕЛЕННОСТИ: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ УКРАИНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА В ЕВРОПЕЙСКОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

Какие тенденции доминируют в развитии современного украинского общества – «позитивная» трансформация или тенденция неопределенности? Анализ динамики факторов технологического прогресса, качества социального капитала дает возможность дать ответ на поставленный вопрос. Данные факторы составляют основу гражданского общества, зрелость которого – в наличии механизмов саморегуляции, социального доверия, ценностно-нормативной и институциональной определенности.

Итак, по первому фактору: слабая технологическая развитость до начала политических изменений в Украине, отсутствие государственных программ, экономическая непривлекательность для крупного бизнеса, очень мало отечественных разработок и собственного производства в сфере высоких технологий не дают возможности говорить о поступательном развитии в сферах технологической и экологической реструктуризации. По второму фактору, оценивание потенциала украинского общества как гражданского позволило выявить следующее: (1) нет оснований утверждать о разделе власти путем включения гражданского общества в структуру управления за слабости механизмов нормативной регуляции, в том числе и саморегуляции, – низкий уровень гражданской активности, участия в неинституциональных организациях и объединениях, кроме того (2) институциональная неопределенность усиливается стабильностью самых низких в Европе показателей доверия к определяющим государственно-политическим институтам, отсутствием положительных сдвигов морально-правовой сферы. Несмотря на незначительное увеличение общенациональных показателей, украинское общество все еще находится в состоянии неопределенности; здесь нельзя выделить один или два доминирующих фактора, способных ускорить темпы трансформации, наоборот, их тесная взаимосвязь скорее замедляет изменения. Вопрос движущей силы остается открытым.

Ключевые слова: социальная трансформация, тенденция неопределенности, социальное доверие, институционализация, социальный капитал.

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TRANSITION FROM THE SHAH TO SHIITE THEOCRACY, AND THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN AS A POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTION

The aim of the paper is to examine the evolution of the Pasdaran (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami or the "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps" but hereinafter referred to as "the Pasdaran") through its various guises as a military-economic-political institution arising from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The analysis will incorporate the Conceptual Framework of Limited Access Order, as set out by Douglass North & others, and will examine the social and historic context in which the Pasdaran participated by reference to the primary social bodies that existed at the time of the Islamic Revolution and their bearing on the development of the Pasdaran as it acquired other characteristics above and beyond its military status. The Pasdaran has achieved an almost unique social-political-economic-military role in Iranian society as it has used its position to secure and maintain the extraction of rents that have placed it in a class of its own and defy meaningful comparison with other real world examples. It is estimated that the Pasdaran controls between 25-40% of Iran's GDP and controls 21% of the Tehran Stock Exchange's market value in sectors such as oil, petrochemicals, telecommunications, construction, mining and metals. Its proximity to the Supreme Leader and its presence in the Majles parliament also enables it to influence the course of Iran's political development for securing its wealth.

Key words: Iran, The Pasdaran, Institutions, Douglass North, Limited Access Order.

Introduction

The aim of the paper is to examine the evolution of the Pasdaran (*Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami* or the "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps" but hereinafter referred to as "the Pasdaran") through its various guises as a military-economic-political institution arising from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In the course of the paper, we will examine its rise to pre eminence as its role metamorphosed from a military force to taking on, in addition to this guise, economic and political characteristics, which have complemented each other.

The tools of the analysis will incorporate the following:

(i) The framework set out by Douglass North & others [North et al, 2009; North et al, 2012].

(ii) Looking at the social and historic context in which the Pasdaran participated by reference to the primary social bodies that existed at the time of the Islamic Revolution and their bearing on the development of the Pasdaran as it acquired other characteristics above and beyond its military status.

(iii) Employing various types of "lenses" – to adapt the optical related terminology. As an optician, in order to test vision and to view clearly objects either from afar or close up, the specialist will add and substitute various lenses in order to sharpen the picture which may otherwise appear "fuzzy". In the essay's context, we will look at other pertinent bodies ranging in time and places from revolutionary France to the Soviet Union/post 1991 Russia, China and others¹. Undoubtedly there are pitfalls since it might be argued that no revolution can be identical in all respects but certain "paths" that could have been taken in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and thereafter were not and those


that were inevitably influenced to an extent how the Pasdaran has emerged in a form that is different from that which such bodies did in, say, Russia (ie the Red Army and state security) or China (ie the People's Liberation Army).

Furthermore in addition to North's framework encompassing Limited Access Order, a further issue arises in the context of the analysis herein: Do political orders create an economic order, or the converse? It might be argued that this is akin to the "chicken and egg" argument as to which comes first? This is of relevance to Iran in that it could be debated, inter alia, that economic issues led to the downfall of the Shah of Iran but that it was political choices made by him that led to both political and economic changes that contributed to the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty. This also impinged on the development of the Pasdaran.

North et al state [North, 2012: p5-9]: "Creation and structuring of rents are the heart of the logic of limited access". In the course of several case studies, the authors examine how a number of different states address how rents are employed – in instances as an incentive to reduce violence and ensure co ordination between sections of the ruling elite. In extreme cases, eg the Congo [North et al, 2012: chapter 3], rents may create incentives to engage in violence. The concept of rents is important in the context of this case study as threats to rents derived by the clergy and bazaaris (the merchant class) would lead to the downfall of the Shah. But the primary thrust of the essay is how the Pasdaran sought to exploit its position as an armed body to secure and then enhance its economic position as a recipient of rents by increasing its political representation.

The structure of Iranian society prior to and post Iranian Revolution

The diagram is a very slimmed down/simplified version of the extended social structure. In short, the monarchy was the primary governing institution. The Pahlavi dynasty had sprung from the Army². The Army was the Shah's primary institution although not necessarily for coercion as this function was fulfilled by SAVAK, the secret police. The Shah appointed the Army's senior officers and he invested considerable money in its upkeep and modernization³. The government served at the pleasure of the Shah and its pictured semi detachment reflects the Shah's employment of it as a transmission belt for his whims and commands.



The Monarchy and the Army derived support and their "raison d'être" from the middle class, the bazaaris (the merchant class) and the clergy. It should not be forgotten that the Shah regained his throne in 1953 with the assistance, not just of the joint covert activities of the CIA/MI6, but particularly through the bazaaris and clergy, who feeling threatened by the possible instability (both personal, business and political) engendered by the then Prime Minister Mossadegh, chose to ally with the Army to return the Shah to power [Kinzer, 2003].

It was the decision by the Shah to pursue the "White Revolution" in the 1960s which was to alienate the two all important "constituencies" of the bazaaris and the clergy which would contribute to the Shah's downfall. A key facet of the Shah's "revolution from above" affected landowners by seeking to promote land reform and thus the Shah sought to appeal directly to the peasant class⁴. Similarly, efforts to improve the status of women, education etc engendered an adverse reaction from the Shiite clergy who felt their status in influencing family life to be threatened. The industrial policies also led to migration of the peasantry to cities where the combined effects of alienation and urbanization would lead to enhanced strength of trade unions and the Tudeh Communist Party – both opponents of the Shah's regime.

Where was the Army?

It still remains unclear why the Army did not take a more prominent role in the unfolding events in late 1978 to 1979. After all, it was officered by an elite with a vested interest in maintaining, if not the Shah, then an orderly takeover rather than a "vacuum" that might be filled by say, armed groups. The rank & file drawn from the peasantry and other social groups were undoubtedly sympathetic to the aims of the revolution. A further element was the confusion and rivalry in Washington, as the major supplier and trainer of the Iranian Army, agonized over whether to back a military coup or not⁵ [Crist, 2012: p. 21-4]. Hesitancy by both the senior officers of

the Army and Washington would lead to vacillation and "sitting on the fence" as events took their course.

The Army's inaction would give the new leaders cause for concern. In the French Revolution, the old royal army was "acquired" by the Revolution who infused its ranks with peasants and town dwellers and only confirmed royalist officers removed. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the remnants of the Tsarist Army were merged with Red Guards and other armed formations and its offices were closely supervised and monitored by political commissars. Neither model was adopted in Iran. Instead, the Pasdaran was formed as a separate fighting force adjacent to the Army.

It is possible to argue that the Army was viewed as a "special asset" by virtue of its ties to both the Shah and the US but that rather than being "written off", it was placed to one side while immense resources and personnel were injected into the new body, the Pasdaran, which gained further prestige for its involvement in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88.

Another related argument was the dilemma created by "principal-agent" theory in that the costs of supervision say, by adopting a "political commissar" system but this time with clergy in the role, would be too considerable. It would require a significant diversion of clerical resources to the armed forces to ensure a level of supervision and control. With the clergy itself not representing a uniform grouping – due to loyalties to different Ayatollahs not all of who agreed with Khomeini's vision⁶, this may have appeared an insurmountable problem. A further factor may also have been concern by the clergy of foregoing rents that were to be derived by their new found status for the less than financially rewarding rigours of military life. North has noted that "organized religion generates important rents" [North et al, 2009: p39].

Transaction cost economics might therefore suggest that the costs of seeking this "off the shelf" existing solution to protecting the "fruits of the Revolution" through supervision, surveillance and ongoing monitoring more than outweighed the separate cost of recruiting an unit that was wholly subservient to the aims of the ruling clerical clique. Besides, the fact that the Army had not suppressed the revolution by indiscriminately firing on its people also weighed on the minds of the clergy – the Army might not choose to fire on the people if ordered to do so by the new power authority. The Pasdaran, by virtue of it owing its existence solely to the new regime, would not be susceptible to such scruples. That said, the new regime would also not want to incur the potential costs of disbanding the Army – thereby releasing its officers and men on to the streets and creating a wellspring of discontent⁷. Far better would be to retain while seeking a more ideologically pliant armed body. The Regular Army would still be of use in the context of defending against an external threat – which duly arrived in the form of Iraq's invasion in 1980.

The Pasdaran's growing role

The Pasdaran's role was embodied in Iran's new constitution⁸ and was defined as "guardian of the revolution". This was of particular relevance as it created a body that rather than being "of the state" served in a "supra" state role. The distinction should not be underestimated – the Pasdaran did not serve the state per se, but the revolution and its leadership. It thus floated above the ordinary rights and obligations of the state and its people.

Its status and prestige would enable it to undergo further transmutations from an armed force to a conglomerate encompassing both economic and political characteristics. Its basis and source of power was derived from the Supreme Leader⁹. Khomeini, the Supreme Leader from 1979 to 1989, himself derived his power & authority from being a long-standing critic of the Shah from the days of the "White Revolution" but was not viewed by his clerical colleagues as the

pre eminent Senior Ayatollah. For Khomeini, the Pasdaran constituted a "blunt instrument" in ensuring both his ascent to, and consolidation of, power, – from the suppression of Kurdish separatists to the elimination of the Tudeh Communist Party¹⁰ and other liberal/secular opponents.

The Pasdaran was also to be employed to secure the passing of power after Khomeini's death to Khamenei, whose authority stemmed solely from Khomeini's anointment as his successor and who possessed even less religious standing amongst the senior clergy¹¹. The Pasdaran served in the capacity akin to the "Praetorian Guard" – indeed its central relevance to politics raises the obvious analogy with Ancient Rome, whereby it will involve itself in the appointment of the successor to Khamenei. For example, it stated that it would not accept a President other than Ahmadinejad in the contested elections of 2009. A further example was the issuance of an open letter by 24 Pasdaran commanders to the then President Khatami (the reformist predecessor of Ahmadinejad) threatening him with action if he did not maintain stability and peace.

The Iran – Iraq war brought considerable kudos to the Pasdaran due its proclaimed reputation as a more vigorous fighting force than the Army. In military terms, given its reputed prowess and its closeness to the Supreme Leader, it was tasked with a number of important defence projects linked to the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. It should be noted that in both the Soviet Union and China, both programmes were the responsibility of the respective regular armed forces although both were subject to tight Communist Party control – a structure nonexistent in Iran. Thus, the Pasdaran became, in effect, the country's military-industrial complex – a position that further enhanced its power and prestige, and which later made it the target of western sanctions by association thereof.

The Pasdaran seeks rents from economic power and the Rise of a New Economic Class

The prominent political role (by virtue of its unaccountability to anyone but the Supreme Leader) would also lead it to exert an increasing influence in the economic sphere. Indeed, while as an instrument of state power it secured its share of rents from the country's oil revenues, it sought to augment this by other means although initially President Rafsanjani had awarded rent deriving activities in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war as a means to check the power of the Pasdaran. In this regard, he miscalculated. As North noted: "Economics is politics by other means"[North et al, 2009: p. 42]. This would bring the Pasdaran into conflict with the bazaaris.

The rise of the economic power of the Pasdaran served to curtail the ability of the bazaaris to generate rents over and above their own quasi monopolistic activities. Thus, the bazaaris' influence and status (both political and economic) would be commensurately diminished.

North quotes Earle: "Economic power is based on the ability to restrict access to key productive resources or consumptive goods...Control over exchange permits the extension of economic control over broader regions...(and) creates the basis of political power"¹² [North et al, 2009: p. 53].

For example¹³, the Pasdaran is heavily involved with Khatam – al – Anbia (Ghorb), which is its engineering wing and which employs over 25,000 employees. This company is, inter alia, currently developing Iran's South Pars gas field, reputedly the second largest in the world and adjacent to Qatar's own major gas field. Other entities with close Pasdaran connections are:

1. Bahman Group – 45 % owned by IRGC and which operates a Mazda assembly line.
2. Bank Melli and subsidized mortgage lending (through bonyads – see below).
3. The Pasdaran also control shipping lines, airlines,

transport and other companies in multiple sectors of the economy, including construction, gas pipelines & public works.

In addition, a further source of economic power is provided by foundations called "bonyads". These are often a continuation of the informal and extralegal economic networks from the reign of the Shah. Two important bonyads, which, while not directly controlled by the Pasdaran, are indirectly influenced by it, are:

a) Bonyad Mostazafan (Foundation of the Oppressed). This is headed by Mohammad Forouzandeh, a former Pasdaran official. It is the largest bonyad with an estimated net worth of over US \$ 3 billion. It has reportedly 200,000 employees and 350 affiliated companies. Its largest subsidiary is the Agricultural and Food Industries Organisation, which owns more than 115 additional entities. Some reports have alleged it facilitated the development of pseudosecret organisations, such as the Nur Foundation, which was established in 1999 to import sugar, construction materials and pharmaceuticals¹⁴.

b) Bonyad Shahid va Omur – e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans' Affairs). Former Pasdaran Air Force commander, Hossein Dhghan, acts as President and Director of this bonyad. It is also involved in business areas similar to Bonyad Mostazafan.

It is estimated that the Pasdaran controls between 25-40% of Iran's GDP compared with just 5% in 1989. It controls 21% of the Tehran Stock Exchange's market value in sectors such as oil, petrochemicals, telecommunications, construction, mining and metals¹⁵.

An example of the Pasdaran employing military force to secure rents to bolster its economic power arose in May 2004 when it ejected a Turkish company from administering the newly built Imam Khomeini International Airport. A Pasdaran entity had lost the tender process but decided to "amend" the decision by force. It was also believed that the Pasdaran wanted to take advantage of the airport for its own black market/smuggling operations.

A further source of rents for the Pasdaran is its control of secret jetties for the importation of illegal goods, including consumer goods, upon which not import taxes are paid, for eventual resale. A member of the Majles (the Iranian parliament) estimated that the Pasdaran's black market operations amounted to \$ 12 billion per annum.

A more contentious source of rents is the Pasdaran's involvement in the illicit drugs trade.

The Pasdaran's position in the economy as well as its approach to securing such a role is worthy of note by comparison with other "similar" bodies. For example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA) close involvement in building business entities [Cheung, 2001] – examples abound in the construction & telecoms sectors. For example, Huawei and ZTE were founded, funded and otherwise developed by military structures. Indeed the PLA's business and economic ambitions were to so alarm the supposed primary institution, the Communist Party, that the then President Jemin issued a formal order banning the military from engaging in business activities.

Another source of reference is the rise of the "entrepreneurial chekists" under Putin's term of office with ex KGB and FSB officers in command of numerous businesses, which generate significant rents, and the FSB earning "protection money" from organised crime gangs¹⁶. That said, the FSB is not the significant armed force that the Pasdaran is and it is the Kremlin which ensures political control using the FSB among other instruments available.

An interesting aspect of the Pasdaran's role in both the military and economic spheres is demonstrated by its public pronouncements in times of heightened regional tensions. Its commanders are prone to issue warnings and

threats, such as emphasising its ability to close the strategically important Straits of Hormuz through which a significant share of the world's oil is shipped. The reactions to such "war talk" or "bluster", are reflected in increased oil prices, which lead to higher revenues and the Pasdaran's share of increased rents arising. It thus has a "vested interest" in issuing such "threats with menaces". This also leads to requiring further resources for the military-industrial complex in times of increased tension from which rents can also be extracted.

The sanctions regime also directly benefit the Pasdaran as it derives rents from the restrictions on imports through charging excessive mark-ups and avoidance of taxes¹⁷. A removal of sanctions (aside from restrictions on arms related technology) and accession to world trade bodies might actually serve to reduce the Pasdaran's rent generating ability.

The growing political influence of the Pasdaran

The final aspect of Pasdaran's burgeoning role was its move to secure political influence in the Majles and major positions of influence throughout government, foreign service, diplomatic posts and other state organs. In 2009, it was estimated that the Pasdaran connected individuals occupied 80 seats out of 290 in the Majles and accounted for 7 out of the 21 cabinet in the Ahmadinejad administration [Ottolenghi, 2011:p29-30; and Wehrey et al, 2009:p77-80].

It might be argued that the Pakistan military exhibits similar traits but this is debateable. Its military reputation falls far short of the Pasdaran – it lost in several wars and armed confrontations with the Indian army. While it has significant economic interests [Siddiqi, 2007], it prefers to wield political power directly (through military dictatorship as under Zia) or indirectly through threats to politicians rather than directly involve itself in parliament.

The Pasdaran's rise as a political class and power group, in addition to its economic power, would lead foreign observers to refer to a "creeping coup" in Iran. This rise was assisted by the Supreme Leader as a means of securing his position from rival centres of power: the clergy (notwithstanding the Supreme Leader was a clerical figure); the bazaar class, by securing significant economic & political advantages; and the Army – all historic threats to the authority of Iran's rulers.

Conclusion

North et al state [North et al, 2009: p. 150-181; North et al, 2012: p17-19] that there are three door stop conditions for a transition from a limited access order to an open access order:

- (i) Existence of perpetual organizations
- (ii) Rules for the elite
- (iii) Civilian control of the military.

With respect to (i), these would appear to be non existent in Iran. The Church represents less an organized body that a disparate grouping of fiefdoms with a "vested interest" in maintaining the present arrangements.¹⁸ With respect to (ii), these are also in doubt. While there are regular elections¹⁹, these are subject to rigging (as in the 2009 Presidential election), candidates are screened and selected by unelected bodies, the Supreme Leader is not open to political challenge and presides over an apparatus that employs his own definition of God's will and religion to coerce segments of the population, and the press is censored. Indeed, the contested 2009 election and subsequent demonstrations would also see the children of the elites beaten, brutalized, arrested and, in certain cases, murdered in the resulting clampdown. Members of the elite would also be subject to house arrest. Furthermore, there appears to be an absence of an open, transparent mechanism for resolving property issues. While private property is permitted under the Constitution, it can be "trumped" by Article 150 in respect of the Pasdaran's role.

Also what happens if there is a struggle between different factions of the Pasdaran over rent extraction? How would such disputes be resolved?

With respect to (iii), all armed forces are subject to the whim of the Supreme Leader and the Pasdaran, due to its constitutional position and accountability solely to the Supreme Leader (itself an unelected position) is far removed from any substantive control & supervision.

Indeed, the Islamic Revolution can be viewed negatively in that it has been almost wholly regressive (and retrogressive) in its nature with human (and particularly, female) rights heavily circumscribed. The Limited Access Order has retrenched and solidified.

The Pasdaran has achieved an almost unique social-political-economic-military role in Iranian society as it has used its position to secure and maintain the extraction of rents that have placed it in a class of its own and defy meaningful comparison with other real world examples.

That said, it is not a monolithic structure and both the political and economic faces of the Pasdaran may yet lead to circumstances where elite members seek to secure their wealth by pursuing rules and creating perpetual organizations as tools towards this end. (A countervailing argument is that its involvement in military-industrial complex might lead to continuing with practices to secure every greater rent extraction or maintain the "status quo"). Its proximity to the Supreme Leader and its presence in the Majles may also enable it to influence the course of Iran's political development for securing its wealth.

Notes

¹ In essence, a "stripped down", or minimalist, version of historical institutionalism, as employed by Barrington Moore, and Skocpol – see "Bibliography".

² The Shah's father was Reza Khan Pahlavi who came to the throne through means of a military coup in 1923.

³ One estimate is over US \$ 8 billion after the 1973 oil price increase

⁴ See North et al, 2012, p298-299 re success of land reform in S Korea in late 1940s and 1950s. Did the Shah seek to imitate but failed due to "vested interests" of the clergy and bazaaris?

⁵ One could also draw comparisons with more recent events in Egypt when the Army did intervene on two separate occasions but then President Mubarak owed his status to the Army although he had forgotten it while the Iranian Army owed its status to the Shah.

⁶ See Pollack, 2005: p144: "Many of the clergy, including Iran's senior-most ayatollahs – the marjas Shariatmadari, Golpaygani and Najafi-Mar'ashi – thought his ideas virtually sacrilegious and his methods extraordinarily dangerous".

⁷ As the US was to discover to its cost when it disbanded the Iraqi army in 2003. Another feature not dwelled on in this paper was the creation of the mass *Basij* militia which served as a conscript body answerable to the Pasdaran. Thus, the Regular Army was "sandwiched" between these two military bodies loyal to the revolution.

⁸ As defined in Article 150 of the 1979 Constitution.

⁹ This is *velayat-e faqih* – the rule of the jurisprudent.

¹⁰ The author recalls reading about the suppression of Tudeh in the foreign news columns of "The Daily Telegraph" between late 1979-1981. The Tudeh was in the time of the Shah one of the world's largest communist parties outside the USSR & China.

¹¹ In fact, Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri was designated successor but was removed due to his objections over mass executions and doubts concerning the concept of *velayat-e faqih*. North discussed principal-agent problem of Pope and medieval church in terms that appear relevant to the situation in Iran. See North et al, 2009: p161 note 7.

¹² I have slightly amended order of sentences but without changing the overall meaning.

¹³ See Ottolenghi, 2011: p41-48; and Wehrey et al, 2009:p55-75, for extensive coverage of Pasdaran's business interests. According to "Wall Street Journal", *Oil Companies Facing Challenge in Iran*, 27 May 2014, Khatam has 40,000 employees. Companies controlled by Khatam were awarded a

large part of US\$ 21 billion in contracts in the giant South Pars gas field after 2010 and currently aiming to secure a further US\$ 5 billion from the Iranian government for building petrochemical facilities and liquefied natural gas plants.

¹⁴ The bonyad also owns "ZamZam" – Iran's "coca cola" drink with 40% market share [Ottolenghi, 2011:p44].

¹⁵ See "Wall Street Journal", *The Ayatollah's Sketchy Prospects*, 28 May 2014. The Pasdaran fully controls 28 publicly traded companies, including Telecommunications Company of Iran, Ansar Bank and Toos Gostar Urban Development.

¹⁶ Harding, 2012: p241: "FSB even protecting the Solntsevo Brotherhood, Moscow's top organised crime gang."

¹⁷ "International Herald Tribune", *For Iran's sick, sanctions turn lethal as drugs vanish*, 3-4 November 2012.

¹⁸ The contrast with Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq could not be starker – he consistently supported a division between state and religion – anathema to a significant proportion of the Iranian clergy.

¹⁹ North et al, 2009:p140: "...all have elections, but these elections do not make them open access orders".

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Варшавська школа економіки, Варшава, Польща

ПЕРЕХІД ВІД ШАХСЬКОЇ ДО ШИЇТСЬКОЇ ТЕОКРАТІЇ І ПІДНЕСЕННЯ ПАСДАРАНУ ЯК ПОЛІТИЧНОГО, ВІЙСЬКОВОГО ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО ІНСТИТУТУ

Мета роботи полягає у вивченні еволюції Пасдаран (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami або "Корпусу вартівих ісламської революції", надалі іменовані "Пасдаран") в його різних формах як військово-економіко-політичного інституту, що походить з іранської революції 1979 року. Аналіз буде включати в себе концептуальні рамки порядку обмеженого доступу, запропоновані Дугласом Норттом та іншими, і охоплює соціальний та історичний контекст, в якому Пасдаран брав участь у взаємодії з основними соціальними органами, які існували під час Ісламської революції, та їх вплив на розвиток Пасдаран в міру набуття їм характеристик військового статусу. Пасдаран домогся майже унікальною соціально-політико-економіко-військовою ролі в іранському суспільстві, використовуючи своє становище для забезпечення і підтримки отримання ренти, що зробило його явищем особливого роду і ускладнювало значуще порівняння з іншими реальними прикладами в світі. Вагається, що Пасдаран контролює приблизно 25-40% ВВП Ірану і 21% від ринкової вартості Тегеранської біржі в таких секторах, як нафта, нафтохімія, телекомунікації, будівництво, гірничодобувна і металургійна промисловість. Його близькість до верховного лідера і його присутність у парламенті також дозволяє йому впливати на хід іранської політичного розвитку для забезпечення його багатства.

Ключові слова: Іран, Пасдаран, інститути, Дуглас Норт, порядок обмеженого доступу.

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ПЕРЕХОД ОТ ШАХСКОЙ К ШИИТСКОЙ ТЕОКРАТИИ И ПОДЪЕМ ПАСДАРАНУ КАК ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО, ВОЕННОГО И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО ИНСТИТУТА

Цель работы заключается в изучении эволюции Пасдаран (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami или "Корпуса стражей исламской революции", в дальнейшем именуемые "Пасдаран") в его различных формах как военно-экономико-политического института, происходящего из иранской революции 1979 года. Анализ будет включать в себя концептуальные рамки порядка ограниченного доступа, предложенные Дугласом Норттом и другие, и охватывает социальный и исторический контекст, в котором Пасдаран участвовал во взаимодействии с основными социальными органами, существовавшим во время Исламской революции, и их влияние на развитие Пасдарана по мере приобретения им характеристик военного статуса. Пасдаран добился почти уникальной социально-политико-экономико-военной роли в иранском обществе, используя свое положение для обеспечения и поддержания извлечения ренты, что сделало его явлением особого рода и затрудняло значимое сравнение с другими реальными примерами в мире. Считается, что Пасдаран контролирует приблизительно 25-40% ВВП Ирана и 21% от рыночной стоимости Тегеранской биржи в таких секторах, как нефть, нефтехимия, телекоммуникации, строительство, горнодобывающая и металлургическая промышленность. Его близость к верховному лидеру и его присутствие в парламенте также позволяет ему влиять на ход иранской политической развития для обеспечения его богатства.

Ключевые слова: Иран, Пасдаран, институты, Дуглас Норт, порядок ограниченного доступа.